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Abstract—Strong secrecy capacity of compound wiretap chan-
nels is studied. The known lower bounds for the secrecy
capacity of compound finite-state memoryless channels under
discrete alphabets are extended to arbitrary uncertainty sets
and continuous alphabets under the strong secrecy criterion.
The conditions under which these bounds are tight are given.
Under the saddle-point condition, the compound secrecy capacity
is shown to be equal to that of the worst-case channel. Based on
this, the compound Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel is studied
under the spectral norm constraint and without the degradedness
assumption. First, it is assumed that only the eavesdropper
channel is unknown, but is known to have a bounded spectral
norm (maximum channel gain). The compound secrecy capacity
is established in a closed form and the optimal signaling is
identified: the compound capacity equals the worst-case channel
capacity thus establishing the saddle-point property; the optimal
signaling is Gaussian and on the eigenvectors of the legitimate
channel and the worst-case eavesdropper is isotropic. The eigen-
mode power allocation somewhat resembles the standard water-
filling but is not identical to it. More general uncertainty sets are
considered and the existence of a maximum element is shown to
be sufficient for a saddle-point to exist, so that signaling on the
worst-case channel achieves the compound capacity of the whole
class of channels. The case of rank-constrained eavesdropper
is considered and the respective compound secrecy capacity is
established. Subsequently, the case of additive uncertainty in the
legitimate channel, in addition to the unknown eavesdropper
channel, is studied. Its compound secrecy capacity and the
optimal signaling are established in a closed-form as well,
revealing the same saddle-point property. When a saddle-point
exists under strong secrecy, strong and weak secrecy compound
capacities are equal.
Index Terms—Wiretap channel, compound channel, MIMO,
strong secrecy, worst-case, saddle-point.
I. INTRODUCTION
The nature of the wireless medium makes wireless com-
munication systems inherently vulnerable for eavesdropping.
In this context, the concept of information theoretic security
is instrumental since it solely uses the physical properties of
the wireless channel in order to establish security. Information
theoretic security was initiated by Shannon [1] and studied
later by Wyner, who introduced the now-popular wiretap chan-
nel [2] modeling the simplest scenario involving security with
one legitimate transmitter-receiver pair and one wiretapper
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(eavesdropper) to be kept secret. There is currently a growing
interest in information theoretic security, see e.g. [3–6].
Since spatial multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) tech-
niques can improve the performance significantly [7], MIMO
architectures have been identified as indispensable for future
wireless systems. Accordingly, investigation of information
theoretic security for MIMO systems is becoming more and
more attractive. The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO
wiretap channel is established in [8–11] under full channel
state information (CSI), where it turns out that Gaussian
signaling is optimal. Subsequently, the optimal transmit co-
variance matrix has then been found under the matrix power
constraint in [12] and under the total power constraint for a
number of special cases [8, 9, 13, 14].
Due to the dynamic nature of the wireless medium, but also
due to implementation issues, practical systems always suffer
from channel uncertainty and estimation/feedback inaccuracy.
Thus, the provision of accurate channel state information to the
transmitter is a major challenge for wireless communication
systems. Along with this, it is hardly possible to expect that
the eavesdropper will share its channel with the transmitter
to make the eavesdropping harder, which makes the perfect
eavesdropper CSI model more than questionable. A reasonable
and well-accepted approach to this problem is to assume that
the exact channel realization is not known; it is only known
that it remains fixed during the entire transmission and that it
belongs to a known set of channels (uncertainty set), which
results in the concept of compound channels [15, 16].
The discrete memoryless compound wiretap channel with
a countably-finite uncertainty set (i.e. finite-state channels) is
studied in [17, 18]. Its secrecy capacity is established under
the degradedness assumption, where all possible realizations
of the eavesdropper channel must be degraded with respect to
all possible realizations of the legitimate channel. When this
condition is not satisfied, only an achievable secrecy rate is
given while the secrecy capacity for the general case remains
unknown.
The corresponding compound Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel with countably-finite uncertainty sets is analyzed in
[17]. Similarly to the discrete memoryless case, its secrecy
capacity is established, again, only under the degradedness
assumption. When the channel is not degraded, the secrecy
capacity itself remains unknown and only an achievable se-
crecy rate is obtained. In [19], the special case of compound
wiretap channels with two possible channel states for the
legitimate receiver and known eavesdropper channel is studied.
Its secrecy capacity is established under the degradedness
assumption and an achievable rate is given in the general (non-
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degraded) case while the capacity is unknown. Interference
alignment for the compound Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel
is explored in [20]. A Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel where
the noiseless eavesdropper channel is arbitrarily varying is
considered in [21]. Its achievable secrecy rate (i.e. lower bound
to the secrecy capacity) is given and the secrecy degrees of
freedom are established, while its capacity remains unknown.
Since degrees of freedom require SNR → ∞, it is not clear
what finite-SNR implications are1.
The discrete memoryless compound broadcast channel with
confidential messages is studied in [23] and its strong secrecy
capacity region is established in a multi-letter form. The
corresponding Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel is consid-
ered in [24] and its achievable degree-of-freedom region is
established, but not the capacity region itself.
In all the previous studies, the compound secrecy capacity
has been established only for the special case of degraded
channels with countably-finite uncertainty sets [17–19]. Ac-
cordingly, it is not clear if these results hold for more general
(e.g. uncountable) or arbitrary uncertainty sets as well or how
these results extend to non-degraded channels. For such non-
degraded channels, only an achievable secrecy rate is obtained
with the consequence that it is not clear how far away this
rate is from its actual capacity. The achievable secrecy rate is
studied from a worst-case secrecy rate maximization point of
view in [25]. Another approach is taken in [20, 21] by studying
the behavior for SNR → ∞. However, this does not provide
any insights on the secrecy capacity or its behavior for the
practical relevant case of finite SNR <∞.
In this paper, we address all these limitations and establish
the (strong) secrecy capacity of compound Gaussian MIMO
channels for a broad class of uncertainty sets (not only finite or
countable) and without the degradedness assumption. We make
use of the compound wiretap model, where the legitimate
channel is perfectly known and the eavesdropper channel is
not known to the transmitter but is known to have a bounded
spectral norm (maximum channel gain), both being fixed
during the whole transmission duration. This represents a
quasi-static scenario where the eavesdropper cannot approach
the transmitter closer than a certain protection distance so
that its channel gain is bounded (due to the propagation
path loss) but is unconstrained otherwise. This automatically
implies only a minimal eavesdropper CSI at the transmitter,
which reflects well the natural eavesdropper desire to be
confidential and its lack of cooperation. Throughout the paper,
full CSI at the eavesdropper is assumed (the safest assumption
from the secrecy perspective). We make no assumptions of
degradedness. The eavesdropper channel uncertainty scenario
is further extended to the case where the legitimate channel is
also allowed to have (additive) uncertainty, which represents
channel estimation and feedback link limitations, and to the
case of more general eavesdropper uncertainty sets, which may
be non-isotropic.
The compound secrecy capacity is established in two main
steps. First, we consider the corresponding discrete memory-
1Two systems having the same degrees of freedom may have vastly-
different capacities, even at high SNR, see e.g. [22].
less (DMC) channel in Section II. For this channel model,
an achievable (strong) secrecy rate was obtained in [18] for
countably-finite uncertainty sets. Building on this result, we
establish a lower bound for the compound (strong) secrecy
capacity under arbitrary uncertainty sets (not necessarily finite
or countable) in Theorem 2, which is subsequently extended
to continuous alphabets in Theorem 3 using the set partition-
ing (quantization) arguments adopted to compound channels
in [26]. The conditions under which these bounds are tight are
given, thus establishing the secrecy capacity. Under the saddle-
point condition, the compound secrecy capacity is shown to
be equal to that of the worst-case channel (so that any code
designed for the worst-case channel also works on the entire
class of channels in the uncertainty set).
Secondly, the (strong) secrecy capacity of the compound
Gaussian MIMO channel is established in Theorem 4 for
the eavesdropper uncertainty with bounded spectral norm
and without the degradedness assumption. This is done by
establishing first an achievable rate of this channel in Corollary
22. Then, in Section V, the worst-case secrecy capacity (i.e.
the capacity of the worst-case channel in the set) is obtained
and the saddle-point property is established in the form
max min = min max, where the maximization is over the
transmit covariance and minimization is over the eavesdropper
channel uncertainty. The saddle-point property has the well-
known game-theoretic interpretation: the mini-max zero-sum
game is between the transmitter (who controls the transmitted
signal distribution) and the eavesdropper (who controls the
channel); neither player can deviate from an optimal strategy
without incurring penalty provided the other player follows it.
Combining all these, we establish the secrecy capacity of
the compound Gaussian MIMO channel in a closed-form,
which also equals the worst-case capacity, so that a code
designed for the worst-case channel works over the whole
class of channels as well. The optimal signaling is Gaus-
sian and on the eigenvectors of the legitimate channel, with
power allocation somewhat similar but not identical to the
regular water-filling. The worst-case eavesdropper is isotropic
with the maximum allowed channel gain. This result is then
extended to a broader class of compound channels, where
the uncertainty set is only required to have a dominant
(maximum/maximal) element and may be non-isotropic. It
is shown that the existence of a maximum element in the
eavesdropper uncertainty set is sufficient for a saddle-point
to exist, so that the compound capacity equals the worst-
case one and signaling on the worst-case channel achieves the
capacity of the whole class of channels. The high/low SNR
regimes are considered and the condition for beamforming
optimality is given. When the eavesdropper uncertainty is
sufficiently large, beamforming is optimal at any SNR. The
case of rank-constrained eavesdropper is considered, motivated
by the scenario where the transmitter is a base station with a
large number of antennas while the receiver/eavesdropper are
handsets with a small number of antennas. Under this non-
convex constraint (in addition to the convex spectral norm
2Unlike [17], this is done for arbitrary (compact) uncertainty sets, not just
countable or finite, and under the strong secrecy constraint.
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constraint), there is no maximum element in the uncertainty
set, yet the saddle-point property is shown to hold and the
compound secrecy capacity is established. Subsequently, a
more general case of two-sided channel uncertainty is studied
in Section VI, where the legitimate channel is also allowed to
have (additive) uncertainty. This reflects the assumption that
the legitimate receiver will share its CSI with the transmitter,
but limitations in feedback link and channel estimation result
in channel uncertainty. The corresponding compound secrecy
capacity is established and shown to be equal to the secrecy
capacity of the worst-case channel in the uncertainty set, so
that the saddle-point property still holds. The optimal signaling
is still on the eigenmodes of the legitimate channel and the
worst-case eavesdropper is isotropic.
While it was established in [27, 28] that the strong and weak
secrecy capacities are the same for regular (non-compound
or known) channels, Section VII demonstrates that the same
holds for compound channels if the saddle-point property
holds under strong secrecy.
Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
Notations: Discrete random variables are denoted by capital
letters and their realizations and ranges by lower case and
script letters, respectively; scalars, vectors, and matrices are
denoted by lower case letters, bold lower case letters, and
bold capital letters; N, R+, and C are the sets of positive
integers, non-negative real, and complex numbers respectively;
|A| and Ac denote the cardinality and the complement of the
set A. I(·; ·) is the mutual information and H2(·) is the binary
entropy function; P(·) is the set of all probability distributions
and E{·} is statistical expectation; X → Y → Z denotes a
Markov chain of random variables X , Y , and Z in this order;
AT , A+, and |A| are the transposition, Hermitian conjugation,
and determinant of A; tr A is the trace of the matrix A and
diag(a) is a diagonal matrix with elements given by a; A ≥ B
means the matrix A − B is positive semi-definite; I is the
identity matrix.
II. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS CHANNELS
In this section we consider discrete memoryless channels
(DMCs) with finite input and output alphabets. Building on
earlier results in [18] for finite-state channels, an achievable
secrecy rate is established for the general case of arbitrary
uncertainty sets (not limited to finite or countable), which is
subsequently extended to continuous alphabets in Section III.
A. Compound Wiretap Channel
Let X and Y , Z be countably-finite input and output sets
and S be a set which will model the channel uncertainty.
The channels to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
(wiretapper) are given by Ws : X ×S → P(Y) and Vs : X ×
S → P(Z), respectively, where s ∈ S is a channel state. For
a fixed state s ∈ S, input and output sequences xn ∈ Xn and
yn ∈ Yn, zn ∈ Zn of block length n, the discrete memoryless
channels are given by Wns (y
n|xn) = ∏ni=1Ws(yi|xi) and
V ns (z
n|xn) = ∏ni=1 Vs(zi|xi). The channels are assume to be
quay-static: s is selected at the beginning and is held constant
during the entire transmission.
Definition 1. The discrete memoryless compound wiretap
channel W is given by
W =
{
(Ws, Vs) : s ∈ S
}
.
Remark 1. This includes the widely adopted model of the
form W = {(Ws1 , Vs2) : s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2} with S1 6= S2 as
one can always construct a new set of the form S = S1×S2.
Definition 2. An (n,Mn)-code Cn for the compound wiretap
channel consists of a stochastic encoder at the transmitter
E :Mn → P(Xn), (1)
i.e., a stochastic matrix, with a set of messages Mn =
{1, ...,Mn} and a decoder at the legitimate receiver described
by a collection of disjoint decoding sets
{Dm ⊂ Yn : m ∈Mn
}
, (2)
so that m̂ = m if yn ∈ Dm, where m̂ is the decoded message
at the receiver.
The encoder in (1) is allowed to be stochastic (this in
fact is essential for achieving secrecy) which means that
it is specified by conditional probabilities E(xn|m) with∑
xn∈Xn E(x
n|m) = 1 for each m ∈ Mn. Then, E(xn|m)
denotes the probability that the message m ∈Mn is encoded
as xn ∈ Xn.
Then for an (n,Mn)-code Cn, the maximum probability of
decoding error at the legitimate receiver is given by
en = sup
s∈S
max
m∈Mn
∑
xn∈Xn
Wns (Dcm|xn)E(xn|m). (3)
Remark 2. Throughout the whole paper we assume that the
transmitter and legitimate receiver do not have full CSI, i.e.,
they do not know the actual realization s ∈ S but do know the
uncertainty set S. Accordingly, encoder (1) and decoder (2)
are universal and do not depend on the particular realization.
On the other hand, we make a conservative (and safest from
secrecy perspective) assumption that the eavesdropper has
perfect CSI of both channels (to the legitimate receiver and
its own).
To keep the transmitted message secret from the eaves-
dropper for all channel realizations s ∈ S, we require the
information leaked to the eavesdropper to be arbitrarily small,
i.e.
sup
s∈S
I(M ;Zns ) ≤ n (4)
for some n > 0 and n → 0 as n → ∞, where M is the
random variable uniformly distributed over the set of messages
Mn and Zns = [Zs,1, Zs,2, ..., Zs,n] is the eavesdropper
channel output for channel realization s ∈ S. This criterion is
known as strong secrecy [27, 28].
Remark 3. The vanishing information leakage to the eaves-
dropper implies that its bit error probability Pb approaches 1/2
as n → ∞ (and thus codeword error probability approaches
1) and the speed of convergence depends on the secrecy
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criterion adopted. In particular, it can be shown (using Fano’s
inequality) that
Pb =
1
2
− o(1) under weak secrecy, (5)
Pb =
1
2
− o
(
1√
n
)
under strong secrecy, (6)
so that Pb → 1/2 in any case, but the speed of convergence
can be arbitrarily slow under weak secrecy, while it is at least
as 1/
√
n under strong secrecy. Using the recent result in [18]
on exponential convergence of information leakage to zero for
the discrete memoryless channel (see (10)), it can be further
shown that
Pb =
1
2
−O(e−an) (7)
i.e. exponentially fast in that scenario, where a > 0. This
provides an operational meaning for secrecy criteria.
Definition 3. A non-negative number Rs is an achievable
secrecy rate if for all δ > 0, there is an n(δ) ∈ N and
a sequence of (n,Mn)-codes {Cn}n∈N with maximum error
probability en such that for all n ≥ n(δ),
1
n
logMn ≥ Rs − δ,
sup
s∈S
I(M ;Zns ) ≤ n,
and en, n → 0 as n → ∞. The compound secrecy capacity
Cc of the wiretap channelW is given by the supremum of all
achievable secrecy rates Rs.
B. Countably-Finite Uncertainty Sets
The discrete memoryless wiretap channel with a countably-
finite uncertainty set (i.e. finite-state channels) is studied in
[17, 18]. In particular, the following achievable secrecy rate
was established in [18, Theorem 2].
Theorem 1 ([18]). The compound secrecy capacity Cc of the
discrete memoryless wiretap channel W is lower-bounded as
follows:
Cc ≥ max
PX
(
min
s∈S
I(X;Ys)−max
s∈S
I(X;Zs)
)
(8)
where the uncertainty set S is countably-finite. Here, the
random variables Ys and Zs denote the outputs of the cor-
responding channels Ws and Vs for s ∈ S.
Furthermore, it has been shown in [18, Theorem 2] that the
secrecy rate given in (8) is achieved with maximum probability
of error of the form
en ≤ |S|1/42−nα (9)
and the secrecy constraint behaving as
max
s∈S
I(M ;Zns ) ≤ 2−nβ (10)
for some α, β > 0. Thus, both criteria, i.e., reliability (3) and
secrecy (4), decrease exponentially fast for increasing block
length n. In addition, both bounds do not depend on the
particular channel realization. These two properties will be
indispensable for extending this result from countably-finite
to arbitrary uncertainty sets.
C. Arbitrary Uncertainty Sets
The result above applies to finite-state channels (i.e.,
countably-finite uncertainty sets) and discrete alphabets. Here,
we extend it to arbitrary uncertainty sets, which are not
required to be finite or countable. Subsequently, it will be
extended to continuous alphabets and compact uncertainty sets
in Section III.
To accomplish this, we adapt the ideas from Blackwell,
Breiman, and Thomasian [15] and approximate arbitrary com-
pound wiretap channels by suitably chosen finite-state chan-
nels.
Lemma 1. Let W = {(Ws, Vs) : s ∈ S} be a discrete
memoryless wiretap channel with arbitrary uncertainty set
S. For every integer L ≥ 2|Y|2|Z|2, there is a compound
wiretap channel WL = {(W s, V s) : s ∈ SL} with a
countably-finite uncertainty set SL, |SL| ≤ (L + 1)|X ||Y||Z|,
such that any (Ws, Vs) ∈W is closely approximated by some
(W s, V s) ∈WL so that
(a) for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , z ∈ Z ,
|Ws(y|x)−W s(y|x)| ≤ |Y||Z|/L, (11a)
|Vs(z|x)− V s(z|x)| ≤ |Y||Z|/L, (11b)
Ws(y|x) ≤ 2
2|Y|2|Z|2
L W s(y|x), (11c)
Vs(z|x) ≤ 2
2|Y|2|Z|2
L V s(z|x). (11d)
(b) For any input distribution PX ∈ P(X ),
|I(X;Ys)− I(X;Y s)| ≤ 2(|Y||Z|)3/2/L1/2, (12a)
|I(X;Zs)− I(X;Zs)| ≤ 2(|Y||Z|)3/2/L1/2. (12b)
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix A.
This shows that we can approximate an arbitrary compound
wiretap channel W by a finite-state one WL so that any
channel in W is close in several senses to one of the new
constructed channels inWL (they can be made arbitrary close
by increasing the number of quantization levels L, which we
exploit below). The next lemma shows that if there is a “good”
code for a wiretap channel, then the same code can be used
for all wiretap channels in its neighborhood.
Lemma 2. Let (Ws, Vs) and (W s, V s) be two wiretap chan-
nels and L > 0 such that Lemma 1 holds. Then any (n,Mn)-
code for (W s, V s) is also an (n,Mn)-code for (Ws, Vs) with
en ≤ 22n|Y|2|Z|2/Le¯n (13)
and
|I(M ;Zns )− I(M ;Z
n
s )|
≤ 4n|Y||Z|2 log |Z|/L+ 4nH2(|Y||Z|2/L). (14)
with H2(·) the binary entropy function. Here, en and e¯n denote
the maximum probabilities of error for the channels Ws and
W s respectively, cf. (3).
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Remark 4. The tight bound in (14) is established based on a
recent result on the continuity of the secrecy capacity of com-
pound wiretap channels [29], which in turn was established
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using a technique developed for quantum channels in [30].
Following instead the classical approach of [15] by applying
(12b) leads to a loose bound
|I(M ;Zns )− I(M ;Z
n
s )| ≤ 2(|Y||Z|)3n/2/L1/2 (15)
which increases exponentially fast in the block length n. This
then prohibits the proof of Theorem 2 (using the number
L of quantization levels that scales up exponentially in n
would not help since the bound in (21) would diverge). Thus,
using the tight bound in (14) (which increases only linearly
in n) is essential. This bound also reveals the scaling of the
number of quantization levels L with n required to make
the approximation error arbitrary small. If only weak secrecy
is of interest, then the normalized difference is bounded by
a constant independent of n, which can be made as small
as desired by using sufficiently large but fixed L, while
strong secrecy requires L to scale faster than n log n for the
approximation error to become arbitrary small.
The two lemmas above allow one to extend the finite-state
result in Theorem 1 to arbitrary uncertainty sets. To proceed
further, we need the following definitions that establish an
ordering of compound wiretap channels.
Definition 4. A compound DMC Vs2 is said to be noisier than
a compound DMC Ws1 if
I(U ;Ys1) ≥ I(U ;Zs2) (16)
for any aggregate channel state s = (s1, s2) ∈ S, any random
variable U and any DMC U → X such that U → X →
(Ys1 , Zs2) is a Markov chain.
Definition 5. Compound DMC Vs2 is said to be (physically)
degraded with respect to compound DMC Ws1 if X → Ys1 →
Zs2 is a Markov chain for any channel state s = (s1, s2) ∈ S
and any input X .
These definitions are an extension of the corresponding
definition for non-compound (single-state) channels, see e.g.
[6, 31]. Similarly to the single-state channels, it can be shown
that “degraded” implies “noisier”, but the converse is not true,
i.e. the latter requirement is weaker than the former (so that
there are channels that are “noisier” but not “degraded”). An
equivalent to the less noisy requirement, which is somewhat
easier to verify, can be established in the same way as for the
single-state channels (see [32]).
Proposition 1. The compound DMC Vs2 is noisier than the
compound DMC Ws1 if and only if I(X;Ys1) − I(X;Zs2)
is concave in the input distribution PX for any channel state
s = (s1, s2) ∈ S.
The compound secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless
wiretap channel W can now be characterized as follows.
Theorem 2. The compound secrecy capacity Cc of the discrete
memoryless wiretap channel W is bounded as follows:
Cc ≥ sup
PX
(
inf
s1∈S1
I(X;Ys1)− sup
s2∈S2
I(X;Zs2)
)
(17)
for any uncertainty set S (not necessarily finite or countable),
and the equality is attained if Vs2 is noisier than Ws1 .
Proof: The proof of the lower bound is based on Lemmas
1 and 2. We approximate the arbitrary compound wiretap
channel W by a finite-state one WL with the number of
quantization levels L = L(n), which is selected in such a
way that:
1) it satisfies the condition of Lemma 1,
2) the secrecy rate supported by the approximated channel
approaches that of the original channel arbitrary closely
(so that L(n)→∞ as n→∞),
3) maximum error probability approaches 0 as n → ∞
(so that L(n) > 2|Y|2|Z|2/α but L(n) has to increase
slower than exponentially),
4) secrecy criterion approaches 0 as n→∞ (so that L(n)
has to increase faster than n log n).
Note that criterion 4) dictates the fastest increase of L(n) and
using the classical approach of [15] would not satisfy it. The
following analysis shows that L = a · n2 is a proper choice
for the number of quantization levels, where
a > 2|Y|2|Z|2 max{1, 1/α}, (18)
and α is as in (9).
For each (Ws, Vs) ∈ W, we select a sufficiently good
approximation (W s, V s) according to Lemma 1. The corre-
sponding finite-state compound channel is denoted by WL
and the countably-finite uncertainty set by SL, where |SL| ≤
(L+ 1)|X ||Y||Z|.
Next, we check the reliability part. Fix input distribution
PX and set the secrecy rate
Rs = min
s∈S
I(X;Y s)−max
s∈S
I(X;Zs)−  (19)
for some  > 0. From Theorem 1, there exists an (n,Mn)-
code for WL with probability of error
e¯n ≤ |SL|1/42−nα
≤ (L+ 1)(|X ||Y||Z|)/42−nα → 0 as n→∞, (20)
where the steps follow from (9), |SL| ≤ (L + 1)|X ||Y||Z|, cf.
Lemma 1, and L = a · n2. Furthermore, from Lemma 1, for
each Ws ∈ W there is an appropriate W s ∈ WL such that
Ws(y|x) ≤ 22|Y|2|Z|2/LW s(y|x) for all x, y. Thus, Lemma
2 implies that the code for WL is also a code for W with
probability of error
en ≤ 2n
2|Y|2|Z|2
L e¯n
≤ |SL|1/42−n(α−
2|Y|2|Z|2
L )
≤ (L+ 1)(|X ||Y||Z|)/42−n(α− 2|Y|
2|Z|2
L ). (21)
Since L = an2, we have en → 0 as n → ∞. This means
the code constructed for the approximated channel WL also
satisfies the reliability criteria for the original channel W.
Thus, it remains to show that the rate of this code is arbitrarily
close to the desired rate and the strong secrecy condition
is satisfied. From Lemma 1(b), one obtains, for any input
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distribution PX ,∣∣∣ inf
s∈S
I(X;Ys)− sup
s∈S
I(X;Zs)
− (min
s∈S
I(X;Y s)−max
s∈S
I(X;Zs)
)∣∣∣
≤ 4(|Y||Z|)3/2/L1/2. (22)
Thus, the difference between the rate achieved by the code for
the approximated finite-state channelWL and the desired rate
for the original channel W is arbitrarily small, since L→∞
as n→∞.
It remains to check that the secrecy constraint is also
satisfied. The code above for the approximated finite-state
channel WL has maxs∈SL I(M ;Z
n
s ) ≤ 2−nβ , cf. Theorem
1 and (10), so that evoking Lemma 2, one obtains
sup
s∈S
I(M ;Zns ) ≤ max
s∈S
I(M ;Z
n
s ) + 4n|Y||Z|2 log |Z|/L
+ 4nH2(|Y||Z|2/L)
≤ 2−nβ + 4|Y||Z|2 log |Z|/(an)
+ 4nH2(|Y||Z|2/(an2))
→ 0 as n→∞ (23)
where we have used nH2(α/n2) → 0 as n → ∞ for any
α > 0. Thus, also the information leaked to the eavesdropper
is arbitrarily small.
To establish the equality part under the noisier condition,
observe that, by extending the proof of the converse in
Theorem 3 of [31] to the compound setting and requiring
the encoder to be independent of the actual channel states,
it can be shown that any achievable secrecy rate is bounded
as follows
Rs ≤ I(X;Ys1)− I(X;Zs2) (24)
for any channel state (s1, s2), where the input X is induced
by the encoder, so that
Rs ≤ inf
s
I(X;Ys1)− I(X;Zs2) (25)
from which it follows that
Cc ≤ sup
PX
inf
s
I(X;Ys1)− I(X;Zs2) (26)
and thus establishes the equality.
Remark 5. The proof of Theorem 2 reveals that the required
scaling of L(n) depends on the secrecy criterion adopted, cf.
in particular (23): this requires L(n) to scale faster than n log n
and motivates the convenient choice of L(n) = a ·n2 for some
a satisfying (18) (in fact, using n1+δ with any δ > 0 would
work as well). Requiring weak secrecy instead allows for the
quantization number L(n) to increase arbitrarily slowly in n
(e.g. as log n or log log n).
Remark 6. It should be emphasized that two properties of the
probability of error (9) and the secrecy (10) are indispensable
to extend the result from finite uncertainty sets to arbitrary
uncertainty sets: its exponentially-fast decreasing behavior and
its independence of the actual channel realization. Thus, such
bounds have to be established carefully for the finite case since
otherwise an extension to the arbitrary case is not possible.
Moreover, the approximation must be done carefully enough
(e.g. as in (14) with L(n) = a · n2) to ensure that both
the secrecy and reliability criteria are still valid after the
approximation.
Remark 7. Since each degraded channel is also “noisier”, the
equality in Theorem 2 also holds for degraded channels.
To proceed further, we need the following definitions.
Definition 6. Compound DMC Vs2 is said to be less capable
than compound DMC Ws1 if for every PX and any channel
state (s1, s2) ∈ S
I(X;Ys1) ≥ I(X;Zs2). (27)
This definition extends the corresponding definition in [6]
to the compound channel setting. Following the same line of
analysis as for single-state channels, it can be shown that the
less capable requirement is strictly weaker than the noisier
one (i.e. each “noisier” channel is also “less capable” but
the converse is not true), and hence strictly weaker than the
degraded one.
Definition 7. A compound wiretap channel is said to have a
saddle-point if
sup
PX
inf
s∈S
(
I(X;Ys1)− I(X;Zs2)
)
= inf
s∈S
sup
PX
(
I(X;Ys1)− I(X;Zs2)
) (28)
where s = (s1, s2) is the aggregate channel state.
Note that this definition does not impose any operational
meaning on the quantities involved. The following corollary
provides such operational meaning.
Corollary 1. If the compound wiretap channel W has a
saddle-point and satisfies the less capable condition, then the
compound secrecy capacity Cc is the same as the worst-case
channel capacity Cw,
Cc = sup
PX
(
inf
s1∈S1
I(X;Ys1)− sup
s2∈S2
I(X;Zs2)
)
= inf
s∈S
sup
PX
(
I(X;Ys1)− I(X;Zs2)
)
= Cw.
(29)
In particular, the channel has a saddle-point if
1) S1,S2 are compact and convex, and
2) I(X;Ys1) − I(X;Zs2) is lower semi-continuous and
quasi-convex in s, and upper semi-continuous and quasi-
concave in PX .
Proof: Since the legitimate and eavesdropper channel
states are independent of each other, it follows that
inf
s1∈S1
I(X;Ys1)− sup
s2∈S2
I(X;Zs2)
= inf
s∈S
(
I(X;Ys1)− I(X;Zs2)
)
(30)
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so that the following chain inequality holds
Cw = inf
s∈S
sup
PX
(
I(X;Ys1)− I(X;Zs2)
)
= sup
PX
inf
s∈S
(
I(X;Ys1)− I(X;Zs2)
)
≤ Cc
≤ Cw (31)
where first equality holds since, from [6, Corollary 3.5],
sup
PX
(
I(X;Ys1)− I(X;Zs2)
)
(32)
is the secrecy capacity under channel state (s1, s2) and the
less capable condition, so that taking infs gives the worst-
case capacity; the first inequality is due to Theorem 2 and the
last inequality is due to the fact that compound capacity cannot
exceed the worst-case one (since the compound code has also
to work on the worst-case channel). This proves Cc = Cw. The
last statement follows from von Newmann mini-max theorem
and its subsequent generalizations, see e.g. [33, Theorem 9.D].
Remark 8. The importance of this result is due to the fact that
a code designed for the worst-case channel also works on the
whole class of channels , i.e. is robust (which is not true in
general).
Remark 9. The requirement of semi-continuity can be dropped
in the case of countably-finite alphabets (since the mutual
information is known to be continuous in such settings), but
it is essential for countably-infinite or continuous alphabets.
Remark 10. Since “noisier” implies “less capable”, Corollary
1 also holds for “noisier” and degraded (physically or stochas-
tically) channels.
Thus, Theorem 2 extends Theorem 1 to arbitrary uncertainty
sets. The next step is to extend this result to continuous
alphabets.
III. CONTINUOUS ALPHABETS
To establish an achievable secrecy rate for the compound
Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel, we have to deal with
continuous input and output alphabets as well as probability
density functions. Therefore, we extend the previous result in
Theorem 2 to continuous alphabets.
Let us consider the general case of input and output al-
phabets X , Y , and Z which are standard [34]. Such alphabets
include practically relevant cases such as continuous alphabets
in Euclidean spaces or finite alphabets (see [34] and [35] for
an extensive discussion of this; the requirement of random
variables to be defined over a standard space ensures that con-
ditional probability measures are well-defined). Accordingly,
we assume that the corresponding random variables can be
described by probability density functions and that all mu-
tual information terms are calculated according to continuous
alphabets and are finite.
Usually, results are extended from discrete memoryless
channels to continuous channels by using the discretization
procedure or partitioning method as outlined for example
in [36]; see [35] or [37] respectively for a more detailed
treatment. Such an approach invokes quantization arguments,
where for any input distribution pX for the continuous channel,
the input and output alphabets are partitioned making the re-
sults for finite alphabets applicable. Letting the corresponding
quantizer be sufficiently fine, the actual mutual information
terms of the partitioned alphabets can be made arbitrarily close
to the continuous one.
Applying this approach to compound channels has to be
done carefully. We have to ensure that the sequence of
successively finer quantizers partitions the input and output
alphabets in such a way that the mutual information terms
between the quantized alphabets approaches the desired terms
for continuous alphabets for all possible channel realizations
simultaneously. Thus, the invoked quantizers must not depend
on a particular channel realization. This issue is discussed in
detail in [26] which studies the compound channel with side
information. The following result is a slight extension of the
corresponding result in [26] to the wiretap channel setting.
Lemma 3. For the compound wiretap channel W with stan-
dard input and output alphabets, there exists a sequence
of successively finer quantizers {qX,k, qY,k, qZ,k}k∈N for the
input and outputs such that for any channel realization s ∈ S
I(X;Ys) = lim
k→∞
I
(
qX,k(X); qY,k(Ys)
)
I(X;Zs) = lim
k→∞
I
(
qX,k(X); qZ,k(Zs)
)
.
This means there exist universal sequences of quantizers which
work for all channel realizations s ∈ S simultaneously if the
input and output alphabets are standard.
Proof: See [26, Lemma 3] and also [35] for further
details.
The second technicality is that one has to ensure that such
sequences of functions converge uniformly on a compact
set when they converge pointwise (this is needed since the
transmitter does not know the channel state).
Lemma 4. Let Ws, Vs be continuously parametrized by s ∈ S,
where S is a compact set. Then, for all channel realiza-
tions s ∈ S and for each input distribution pX , there
exists a sequence of successively finer universal quantizers
{qX,k, qY,k, qZ,k}k∈N such that for each  > 0, there is an
n() ∈ N such that for every k ≥ n(),
I
(
qX,k(X); qY,k(Ys)
)− I(qX,k(X); qZ,k(Zs))
≥ inf
s∈S
I(X;Ys)− sup
s∈S
I(X;Zs)− .
Proof: The proof follows by applying [26, Lem-
mas 4 and 5] to both terms I(qX,k(X); qY,k(Ys)) and
I(qX,k(X); qZ,k(Zs)).
Having these technicalities in mind, we are now in the po-
sition to establish the desired result for continuous alphabets.
Theorem 3. The compound secrecy capacity Cc of the wiretap
channel W continuous in s and with standard (possibly
continuous) input and output alphabets is bounded as follows:
Cc ≥ sup
pX
(
inf
s1∈S1
I(X;Ys1)− sup
s2∈S2
I(X;Zs2)
)
(33)
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for any compact uncertainty set S, and the equality is attained
if Vs2 is noisier than Ws1 .
Proof: To prove the lower bound, we follow the dis-
cretization procedure and use sequences of successively finer
quantizers {qX,k, qY,k, qZ,k}k∈N according to Lemmas 3 and
4 which partition the continuous input and output alphabets
in such a way that we end up with mutually disjoint events
which cover the entire spaces. Then, all mutual information
terms are calculated according to these partitions.
For each choice of quantizers qX,k, qY,k, qZ,k, the whole
encoding and decoding procedure as used in the proofs of
Theorems 1 and 2, cf. also [18], is done according to this
partition. Then, the analysis of probability of error and the
analysis of the secrecy criterion for finite alphabets ensures
that any rate Rs satisfying
Rs < sup
PX
(
inf
s∈S
I
(
qX,k(X); qY,k(Ys)
)
− sup
s∈S
I
(
qX,k(X); qZ,k(Zs)
)
is achievable with strong secrecy for the compound wiretap
channel.
From Lemmas 3 and 4, for standard alphabets X , Y , Z ,
and any  > 0, one can find sequences of successively finer
quantizers {qX,k, qY,k, qZ,k}k∈N such that for sufficiently large
n and any k ≥ n,
inf
s∈S
I
(
qX,k(X); qY,k(Ys)
)− sup
s∈S
I
(
qX,k(X); qZ,k(Zs)
)
≥ inf
s∈S
I(X;Ys)− sup
s∈S
I(X;Zs)− 
(34)
so that any rate
Rs ≤ sup
pX
( inf
s∈S
I(X;Ys)− sup
s∈S
I(X;Zs))− 
is achievable for standard (continuous) alphabets as well, from
which (33) follows. Note that as the uncertainty set is assumed
to be compact and therewith bounded, all terms are well
defined and finite for standard alphabets as well. The equality
part is established as in Theorem 2 (using the upper bounds in
(24)-(26), which apply to continuous alphabets as well). This
completes the proof.
Using this theorem, Corollary 1 can be extended to contin-
uous alphabets in a natural way.
IV. GAUSSIAN MIMO CHANNELS
We are now in the position to specialize the result in
Theorem 3 to Gaussian MIMO channels. To this end, let NT
be the number of transmit antennas at the transmitter and N1(2)
be the numbers of receive antennas at the legitimate receiver
(eavesdropper). The input-output relations for the Gaussian
MIMO wiretap channel are given by
y1 = H1x + ξ1, y2 = H2x + ξ2 (35)
where x = [x1, x2, ..., xNT ]
T ∈ CNT×1 is the transmitted
signal, y1(2) ∈ CN1(2)×1 is the signal at the legitimate receiver
(eavesdropper), ξ1(2) ∈ CN1(2)×1 is the circularly-symmetric
additive white Gaussian noise at the receiver (eavesdropper)
(normalized to unit variance in each dimension), and H1(2) ∈
CN1(2)×NT is the matrix of the complex channel gains between
each transmit and each receive (eavesdropper) antenna. The
channels H1(2) are assumed to be fixed (constant) during the
whole transmission of block length n. We assume an average
transmit power constraint tr R ≤ PT where PT is the total
transmit power and R = E{xx+} is the transmit covariance
matrix.
For this channel, the secrecy capacity subject to the total
average transmit power constraint is [8–11]
Cs = max
R
ln
|I + W1R|
|I + W2R| (36)
where Wi = H+i Hi, i = 1, 2, and max is subject to the
constraints R ≥ 0 and tr R ≤ PT .
It is well-known that the problem in (36) is not convex
in general and explicit solutions for the optimal transmit
covariance are not known for the general case, but only for
some special cases (e.g. low-SNR, MISO channels, or for the
full-rank case) [8–11, 13].
Let us now consider a compound Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel where the exact channel realizations H1 and H2 are
unknown. It is only known to the legitimate user that they
belong to the compact set S. Again, we make the safest
assumption from the secrecy perspective and assume that
the eavesdropper knows both H1 and H2, cf. also Remark
2. Then, evaluating Theorem 3 for this particular choice
of compound Gaussian MIMO channel yields the following
achievable secrecy rate.
Corollary 2. The (strong) compound secrecy capacity Cc of
the compound Gaussian MIMO channel in (35) is lower-
bounded as follows:
Cc ≥ max
R
min
W1,W2
ln
|I + W1R|
|I + W2R|
where max and min are subject to R,W1,W2 ≥ 0, tr R ≤
PT , and W1, W2 belong to a compact set S.
A similar result was given earlier in [17, Lemma 1]
under the weak secrecy constraint and finite-state channels
(countably-finite uncertainty sets). Corollary 2 extends it to
strong secrecy and arbitrary (compact) uncertainty sets.
V. EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL UNCERTAINTY
Let us now consider a particular compound channel where
H1 is given (known to the transmitter) and H2 can be any
(unknown) subject to the spectral norm constraint
S2 =
{
H2 : |H2|2 = max|x|=1 |H2x| ≤
√

}
=
{
W2 : |W2|2 = λ1(W2) ≤ 
} (37)
where |x| = √x+x is the Euclidean norm of x, |H|2 = σ1(H)
is the spectral norm of H, i.e. its largest singular value σ1(H);
λ1(W2) is the largest eigenvalue of W2. Thus, the set S2
includes all W2 that are less than or equal to I.
Note that |Hx| represents the channel (voltage) gain in
transmit direction x so that |H|2 is the largest channel
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gain. |W|2 represents the largest channel power gain. The
importance of the spectral norm in the context of regular
MIMO channels has been discussed in [38]. Essentially the
same motivation applies to the secure MIMO channel here.
In particular, the set in (37) limits the maximum gain of the
eavesdropper channel without putting any constraint on its
eigenvectors. This represents the physical scenario where the
eavesdropper cannot approach the transmitter beyond a certain
minimum (protection) distance (so that the channel gain is
bounded due to propagation path loss) being unconstrained
otherwise.
To establish the secrecy capacity of this compound channel
(not necessarily degraded) in Theorem 4, we establish first a
number of intermediate results in Propositions 2 and 3.
A. Worst-Case Secrecy Capacity and Saddle-Point Property
The following proposition gives the capacity of the worst-
case channel in this set. For this purpose we define
C(R,W2) = ln
|I + W1R|
|I + W2R| (38)
which depends on the transmit covariance matrix R and the
eavesdropper channel W2 = H+2 H2 unknown to the trans-
mitter. The channel to the legitimate receiver W1 = H+1 H1
is fixed and known to the transmitter.
Proposition 2. Consider the class of channels in (35) for a
given (known) W1 and any W2 ∈ S2 (as in (37)). Then, the
secrecy capacity Cw of a worst-case channel is
Cw = min
W2
max
R
C(R,W2) = C
∗() (39)
where max and min are over all admissible R,W2: R,W2 ≥
0, tr R ≤ PT , W2 ∈ S2, i.e. |W2|2 ≤ , and
C∗() = max
trR≤PT
C(R, I) (40)
is the secure capacity for the isotropic eavesdropper W2w =
I, which is the worst-case eavesdropper in S2.
Proof: Observe that |I+WR| is monotonically increasing
in W, i.e.
|I + W1R| ≥ |I + W2R| if W1 ≥W2
(see e.g. [39]), so that
C(R,W2) ≥ C(R, I)
for any R, with equality if W2 = I. Taking min max of both
parts results in (39).
It follows from Proposition 2 that the isotropic eavesdropper
is the worst-case one under a bounded channel gain for any
W1. This is also appealing from the channel feedback perspec-
tive: it is hardly possible to expect that the eavesdropper will
share its channel with the transmitter to make eavesdropping
harder, so only minimal information can be expected by the
transmitter about the eavesdropper channel.
The secrecy capacity C∗() under the isotropic eavesdrop-
per has been studied in details in [40], including its high/low
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Fig. 1. Secrecy capacity for the isotropic eavesdropper and the capacity of
the regular MIMO channel (no eavesdropper,  = 0) vs. the SNR (= PT
since the noise variance is unity); λ1(W1) = 2, λ2(W1) = 1. Note the
saturation effect at high SNR, where the capacity strongly depends on  but
not the SNR, and the negligible impact of the eavesdropper at low SNR.
SNR approximations and capacity bounds for the general (non-
isotropic) case. In particular, C∗() is a decreasing, convex
function of . As Fig. 1 shows, the presence of eavesdropper
results in capacity saturation at high SNR, where the eaves-
dropper’s impact is much more pronounced.
The following proposition demonstrates the saddle-point
property for the class of channels in (37) which will be
important later to prove the converse result for the compound
secrecy capacity.
Proposition 3. Consider the class of channels in (35) for a
given (known) W1 and any W2 ∈ S2. The following saddle-
point property holds:
max
R
min
W2
C(R,W2) = min
W2
max
R
C(R,W2) (41)
where max and min are over all admissible R,W2.
Proof: For the max-min part, observe that C(R,W2) ≥
C(R, I) (which follows from the proof of Proposition 2), so
by taking max min of both parts, one obtains
max
R
min
W2
C(R,W2) ≥ max
R
C(R, I). (42)
On the other hand, by using W2 = I instead of min, one
obtains
max
R
min
W2
C(R,W2) ≤ max
R
C(R, I) (43)
so that
max
R
min
W2
C(R,W2) = max
R
C(R, I)
= min
W2
max
R
C(R,W2). (44)
This proves the desired saddle-point property.
B. Compound Secrecy Capacity
The saddle-point property above is instrumental in estab-
lishing the secrecy capacity of the compound MIMO channel
in (35) and (37) as the following theorem shows.
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Theorem 4. Consider the compound Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel in (35) with known W1 and unknown W2 belonging
to the uncertainty set S2 in (37). Its compound secrecy
capacity Cc is
Cc = max
R
min
W2
C(R,W2)
= min
W2
max
R
C(R,W2)
= C∗() (45)
where max and min are over all admissible R,W2. The
optimal signaling is Gaussian and on the eigenmodes of the
legitimate channel,
R∗ = U1Λ∗U+1 , (46)
where the columns of unitary matrix U1 are the eigenvectors of
W1, diagonal matrix Λ = diag{λ∗i } collects the eigenvalues
of R∗,
λ∗i =
+ gi
2gi
zi, zi =
√
1 +
4gi
(+ gi)2
(
gi − 
λ
− 1
)
+
− 1 (47)
and λ > 0 is found from the total power constraint
∑
i λ
∗
i =
PT , gi = λi(W1), (x)+ = max{x, 0}. The secrecy capacity
can be expressed as
C∗() =
∑
i
ln
1 + giλ
∗
i
1 + λ∗i
=
∑
i+
ln
gi

+
∑
i+
ln
2+ (+ gi)zi
2gi + (+ gi)zi
(48)
where the summation is over the set of active eigenmodes:
i+ = {i : gi > λ+ }. (49)
Proof: Note first that
Cc ≤ min
W2
max
R
C(R,W2), (50)
i.e., the compound capacity cannot exceed the worst-case
capacity in the class and the latter is achieved by Gaussian
signaling. On the other hand, it follows from Corollary 2 that
Cc ≥ max
R
min
W2
C(R,W2) (51)
= min
W2
max
R
C(R,W2) (52)
where the equality is from Proposition 3. Combining the lower
and upper bounds, (45) and optimality of Gaussian signaling
for the compound channel follow. The optimal covariance in
(46)-(47) and the capacity in (48) follow from Proposition 2
in [40] since the worst-case eavesdropper is isotropic.
Note that this theorem does not require the compound
channel to be degraded (as is the case for the known capacity
results, where all eavesdropper channel states are required
to be degraded with respect to all legitimate user channel
states). It shows that the secrecy capacity of the worst-case
channel is also the (compound) secrecy capacity of the class
of channels (achievable by a single code on the whole class) so
that Gaussian signaling is optimal, and the following saddle-
point inequalities hold for any feasible R and W2,
C(R, I) ≤ Cc = C(R∗, I) ≤ C(R∗,W2) (53)
where (R∗, I) is the saddle-point. The inequalities in (53)
follow from (45), cf. also [33, 41]. It is remarkable that this
result holds for any W1 and hence does not require the
channel to be degraded (unlike all known to date results).
The saddle-point property in Proposition 3 is instrumental in
establishing the optimality of Gaussian signaling and hence the
compound secrecy capacity for the non-degraded case (using
this property avoids the need to prove the converse directly -
the most difficult part of establishing the compound secrecy
capacity for the non-degraded case).
The inequalities in (53) have the well-known game-theoretic
interpretation: the transmitter sets R = R∗ and the adversary
(nature or eavesdropper) sets W2 = I; neither player can de-
viate from this strategy without incurring a penalty (provided
that the other player follows it).
Note that the optimal signaling directions that achieve the
compound capacity are the same as those for the regular
MIMO channel (no eavesdropper) but the power allocation
{λ∗i } is somewhat different from the regular water-filling
(WF), even though it shares many of its properties, which
is summarized below (see [40] for further details).
Proposition 4. Properties of the optimum power allocation:
1) λ∗i is an increasing function of gi (strictly increasing
unless λ∗i = 0 or PT ) , i.e. stronger eigenmodes get
more power (as in the standard WF).
2) λ∗i is an increasing function of PT (strictly increasing
unless λ∗i = 0). λ
∗
i = 0 for i > 1 and λ
∗
1 = PT as
PT → 0 if g1 > g2, i.e. only the strongest eigenmode is
active at low SNR, and λ∗i > 0 if gi >  as PT → ∞,
i.e. all sufficiently strong eigenmodes are active at high
SNR.
3) λ∗i > 0 only if gi > , i.e. only the legitimate eigenmodes
stronger than the eavesdropper ones can be active.
4) λ is a strictly decreasing function of PT and 0 < λ <
g1− ; λ→ 0 as PT →∞ and λ→ g1−  as PT → 0.
5) There are m+ active eigenmodes if the following in-
equalities hold:
Pm+ < PT ≤ Pm++1 (54)
where Pm+ is a threshold power (to have at least m+
active eigenmodes):
Pm+=
m+−1∑
i=1
+ gi
2gi
(√
1 +
4gi
(+ gi)2
gi − gm+
(gm+ − )+
− 1
)
,
(55)
for m+ = 2, ..., NT and P1 = 0, so that m+ is an
increasing function of PT .
The two terms in (48) represent the high-SNR asymptote
and its (negative) correction term of the secrecy capacity
respectively, so that
C∗()→
∑
i+
ln
gi

, i+ : gi+ > , (56)
as SNR → ∞. In this regime, only those eigenmodes are
active which are stronger than the eavesdropper (gi+ > ).
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
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Sa
Fig. 2. An example of two uncertainty sets whenW2 = diag{d1, d2} ≥ 0.
The (whole) set Sa corresponds to the uncertainty set given in (37), while
the shaded set Sb corresponds to (60).
Since the 2nd term is negative and increasing, it follows that
C∗() ≤
∑
i+
ln
gi

, i+ : gi+ > , (57)
at any SNR. Fig. 1 illustrates this regime.
At low SNR, only the strongest mode is active and
C∗() = ln
1 + g1PT
1 + PT
≈ (g1 − )PT (58)
where gi are in decreasing order, and 2nd equality holds when
(g1−)PT  1. It follows from (55) that only one eigenmode
is active, i.e. beamforming is optimal (which is appealing from
practical perspective due to its low complexity), when
PT ≤ + g1
2g1
(√
1 +
4g1
(+ g1)2
g1 − g2
(g2 − )+ − 1
)
(59)
In particular, it is the case at any SNR if g2 ≤  (provided that
g1 > ), i.e. when the eavesdropper uncertainty is sufficiently
large.
C. Broader Class of Compound MIMO Channels
The result in Theorem 4 can be further extended to a
broader class of compound MIMO channels. To this end, let us
generalize the uncertainty set S2 for the eavesdropper channel
as follows
W2 ∈ S2 →W2 ≤ I ∈ S2, (60)
i.e., all its members are less than or equal to I. Unlike (37),
it may include not all such W2; it is not required to be
convex, compact etc. Fig. 2 illustrates the difference between
the uncertainty sets defined in (37) and (60) for diagonal W2.
Proposition 5. Consider the compound Gaussian MIMO wire-
tap channel in (35) when W1 is known and unknown W2
belongs to the uncertainty set S2 in (60). Its compound secrecy
capacity is Cc = C∗(), i.e., as in Theorem 4.
Proof: Observe that the compound secrecy capacity of
this channel is not smaller than that in Theorem 4, since
the uncertainty set here is included in the uncertainty set of
Theorem 4 (which includes all W2 ≤ I, since it is equivalent
Sa
d1
d2
W ∗2
S2m
Sb
Fig. 3. An example of two uncertainty sets Sa and Sb when m = 2 and
W2 = diag{d1, d2} ≥ 0. Sa has a (unique) maximum elementW∗2 (dark
dot) while Sb does not, but only a set of maximal elements (dark line) S2m.
to λ1(W2) ≤ ). On the other hand, setting W2 = I
demonstrates that the lower bound is achieved by this worst-
case channel. Since the compound capacity does not exceed
the worst-case one, the desired result follows.
We remark that the set S2 is not necessarily convex or
compact (as required by Theorem 3), nor it has some other
“nice” properties, except that I is its dominant element, and
that Theorem 4 is a special case. This clearly demonstrates
the importance of the isotropic eavesdropper for compound
MIMO wiretap channels.
To generalize these results further, we will need the follow-
ing definitions.
Definition 8. Let S2 be an uncertainty set of W2. W∗2 is its
(unique) maximum element if W∗2 ∈ S2 and ∀W2 ∈ S2 →
W2 ≤W∗2 .
Definition 9. W2m is a maximal element of S2 if
W2,W2m ∈ S2,W2 ≥ W2m → W2 = W2m (i.e. the
only element in S2 greater or equal to W2m is W2m itself).
Note that Definition 9 is due to the fact that not any two
positive semi-definite matrices can be compared (i.e. it can be
that neither W1 ≥ W2 nor W1 < W2 is true, unlike the
scalar case), so that a maximum element may not exist. While
maximum element, if it exists, is unique, there may be many
maximal elements in a set (see e.g. [41] for more details).
Fig. 3 illustrates these definitions for the case of diagonal W2
and m = 2.
We are now in a position to generalize Proposition 5.
Proposition 6. Consider the compound Gaussian MIMO wire-
tap channel in (35) when W1 is known and unknown W2
belongs to an uncertainty set S2, whose maximum element is
W∗2 . The saddle-point property holds, so that the compound
secrecy capacity Cc equals to the worst-case secrecy capacity
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Cw:
Cc = max
R
min
W2∈S2
C(R,W2)
= min
W2∈S2
max
R
C(R,W2) = Cw
= max
R
C(R,W∗2) (61)
where the worst-case channel is W∗2 , and the transmission on
this channel is optimal for the whole class of channels in S2.
Proof: Observe that
C(R,W2) ≥ C(R,W∗2) ∀R,W2 ∈ S2 (62)
which is due to the fact that |I + WR| is monotonically
increasing in W [39] for any (positive semi-definite) R, so
that, by using max min and min max on both sides, one
obtains
max
R
min
W2∈S2
C(R,W2) = max
R
C(R,W∗2)
= min
W2∈S2
max
R
C(R,W2) = Cw.
(63)
To prove the operational meaning of the max min part, observe
that Corollary 2 does not apply directly as S2 is not neces-
sarily compact. Instead, consider another compact set S ′2 that
includes all positive semi-definite W2 such that W2 ≤W∗2 .
Clearly, this set is closed and bounded and hence compact, and
S2 ⊆ S ′2, so that its compound capacity C ′c satisfies C ′c ≤ Cc.
Applying Corollary 2 to S ′2, one obtains
Cw = min
W2∈S2
max
R
C(R,W2)
= min
W2∈S′2
max
R
C(R,W2)
= max
R
min
W2∈S′2
C(R,W2)
≤ C ′c ≤ Cc ≤ Cw
where the 2nd equality is due to the fact that (62) holds for
S ′2 as well so that Cw is the same for S2 and S ′2 (since both
sets have the same maximum element W∗2); the 3rd equality
is due to the fact that (63) holds for S ′2 as well. This proves
C ′c = Cc = Cw and hence the desired result.
This proposition says, in effect, that the saddle-point prop-
erty holds and, thus, the compound secrecy capacity equals
the worst-case one, if a maximum element of the uncertainty
set S2 exists3 and the rest of its structure is irrelevant.
When the uncertainty set does not have a maximum ele-
ment, its compound and worst-case secrecy capacities can be
characterized using minimal elements as follows.
Proposition 7. Consider the compound Gaussian MIMO
channel in (35) when W1 is known and unknown W2 belongs
to a bounded and closed uncertainty set S2, which does not
have a maximum element. Then,
min
W2∈S2
C(R,W2) = min
W2∈S2m
C(R,W2) ∀R (64)
3Recall that it is not the case in general and many sets of positive semi-
definite matrices do not have a maximum element, as Fig. 3 shows.
where S2m is the set of all maximal elements W2m of S2,
and hence
Cw = min
W2∈S2
max
R
C(R,W2) = min
W2∈S2m
max
R
C(R,W2)
(65)
Cc ≥ max
R
min
W2∈S2
C(R,W2) = max
R
min
W2∈S2m
C(R,W2)
(66)
i.e. minimizing over the whole uncertainty set S2 is equivalent
to minimizing over (normally much smaller) set of its maximal
elements.
Proof: Since the proof is highly technical, it is relegated
to Appendix C.
We remark that Proposition 7 effectively reduces the dimen-
sionality of the related optimization problem: if the original
problem in (65) is D-dimensional, the reduced one (on the
right hand side) is at most (D−1)-dimensional, since S2m is
on the boundary of S2 (this can be proved by contradiction).
In some cases, this proposition can be applied even if S2 is not
compact by enclosing it in a bigger compact set S ′2 provided
that the minimum in (64) is the same for both sets.
The last two propositions demonstrate the key role of the
maximum element in the uncertainty set: if it exists, a saddle-
point exists, so it is a sufficient condition. It can be shown,
via examples, that the absence of a maximum element may or
may not result in the absence of a saddle-point, so there is no
necessary condition here.
D. Rank-Constrained Eavesdropper
In this section, we consider the case where there is an extra
constraint on the rank r(W2) of the eavesdropper channel
W2, r(W2) ≤ r2 for given r2 ≤ NT . This constraint is
motivated by the fact that r(W2) ≤ N2 so that when the
number N2 of eavesdropper antennas is small, N2 ≤ NT , full-
rank W2 is not possible so that the results in Theorem 4 may
be too conservative4. This applies in particular to a massive
MIMO case, where the transmitter is a base station with a large
number of antennas and the receiver/eavesdropper are handsets
with a small number of antennas (due to the size/complexity
constraints), so that NT  N1, N2.
The eavesdropper uncertainty set is of the form
S2a =
{
W2 : |W2|2 ≤ , r(W2) ≤ r2
}
(67)
where the 1st inequality reflects the fact that the eavesdropper
channel gain is bounded (due to e.g. minimum propagation
path loss) and the 2nd one reflects the fact that the rank is
bounded due to e.g. small number of eavesdropper antennas.
The compound secrecy capacity can now be characterized as
follows.
Theorem 5. Consider the compound Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel in (35) with known W1 and unknown W2 belonging
to the uncertainty set S2a in (67); assume that the rank of the
4This problem formulation was suggested by A. Khisti.
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legitimate channel satisfies r(W1) = r1 ≤ r2. The compound
secrecy capacity Cc of this channel is as follows:
Cc = max
R
min
W2
C(R,W2)
= min
W2
max
R
C(R,W2)
=
r1∑
i=1
ln
1 + giλ
∗
i
1 + λ∗i
= C∗() (68)
where max and min are over all admissible R,W2: R,W2 ≥
0, tr R ≤ PT , W2 ∈ S2a. The optimal signaling is Gaus-
sian and on the eigenmodes of the legitimate channel as in
(46), and λ∗i is as in (47). The worst-case eavesdropper is
W∗2 = U1aU
+
1a, where the columns of semi-unitary matrix
U1a are the eigenvectors of W1 corresponding to strictly
positive eigenvalues.
Proof: First, observe that {σi(HR 12 )} is weakly ma-
jorized by {σi(H)σi(R 12 )} (see e.g. [42]), i.e.
k∑
i=1
σi(HR
1
2 ) ≤
k∑
i=1
σi(H)σi(R
1
2 ), 1 ≤ k ≤ NT (69)
where all singular values σi are in decreasing order. Therefore,
ln |I + W2R| =
r2∑
i=1
ln(1 + σ2i (H2R
1/2))
≤
r2∑
i=1
ln(1 + σ2i (H2)σ
2
i (R
1/2))
≤
r2∑
i=1
ln(1 + λi(R)) (70)
where we have used the fact that σ2i (R
1
2 ) = λi(R), σ2i (H) =
λi(W). The 1st inequality is due to [42, Theorem 3.3.14]
and the fact that ln(1 + ex) is convex in x and ln(1 + x2)
is continuous, and the 2nd inequality is due to λi(W2) ≤
|W2|2 ≤ . Similarly, we have
ln |I + W1R| ≤
r1∑
i=1
ln(1 + λi(W1)λi(R)). (71)
Using these two upper bounds and observing that the 2nd one
is achieved by using R with the same eigenvectors as those
of W1 and such choice of eigenvectors does not affect the
bound in (70), one obtains, using Theorem 3:
Cc ≥ max
R
min
W2
C(R,W2)
≥ max
R
{ln |I + W1R| −
r2∑
i=1
ln(1 + λi(R))}
= max
λi: λi≥0,
∑
i λi≤PT
r1∑
i=1
ln
1 + λi(W1)λi
1 + λi
= C∗() (72)
where the sum is limited to r1 due to r1 ≤ r2 so that, from
Corollary 1 in [13], r(R∗) ≤ r1. On the other hand, since the
worst-case capacity is not less than the compound one,
Cc ≤ Cw = min
W2
max
R
C(R,W2)
≤ max
R
C(R,W∗2)
= max
λi: λi≥0,
∑
i λi≤PT
r1∑
i=1
ln
1 + λi(W1)λi
1 + λi
= C∗()
(73)
where the 2nd equality is due to the fact that when W1
and W2 have the same eigenvectors, signaling on those
eigenvectors is optimal (see [43, Proposition 1]). This proves
the saddle-point and thus establishes the capacity Cc = Cw =
C∗(). The optimal signaling follows from (70) and (71)
where the equalities are attained by W2 = U1aU+1a and
R = U1aΛU
+
1a, which also attains the equalities in (72) and
(73).
Remark 11. Note that the worst-case eavesdropper W∗2 =
U1aU
+
1a is ”isotropic” on the sub-space spanned by the
columns of U1a (but not on the whole space), which is known
as “omni-directional” in the antenna literature [44] (i.e. having
the same gain in all directions of that sub-space). Comparing
Theorems 4 and 5, one concludes that the eavesdropper rank
constraint has no effect on the capacity and optimal signaling
provided that r1 ≤ r2 holds.
Remark 12. Unlike the rank-unconstrained case, there is no
dominant channel in the rank-constrained uncertainty set, i.e.
W2 ≤ W∗2 does not hold for all W2 ∈ S2a, so that the
uncertainty set is not ”degraded” (with respect to W∗2 or any
other W2). Since the set S2a is not convex either, one cannot
use Von Neumann mini-max Theorem (or its extensions) to
infer an existence of saddle-point, which is established in
(68) via the singular value inequalities, so that the following
inequalities hold for any feasible R and W2,
C(R,W∗2) ≤ Cc = Cw = C(R∗,W∗2) ≤ C(R∗,W2) (74)
where (R∗,W∗2) is the saddle-point. It can be demonstrated
(via examples) that the saddle-point property does not hold if
r1 > r2.
Remark 13. The condition on the ranks r1 ≤ r2 is insured if
N1 ≤ N2 and both channels are of full raw ranks. In particular,
this holds if N1 = N2 = 1.
VI. DOUBLE-SIDED CHANNEL UNCERTAINTY
Here we consider the case where both the legitimate and
eavesdropper channels are uncertain. The compound channel
model follows the model in (35) where:
S1 =
{
H1 : H1 = H0 + ∆H, |∆H|2 ≤ 1
}
(75a)
S2 =
{
W2 : |W2|2 ≤ 
}
(75b)
where H0 is the nominal part of H1 known to the transmitter,
and ∆H is the uncertain, unknown part; |∆H|2 = σ1(∆H)
is the spectral norm of ∆H, i.e. the largest singular value
σ1(∆H). The uncertainty of W2 follows the same model as
in (37). This compound model reflects two important points:
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1) The desire of the eavesdropper to be confidential to
keep its spying abilities uncompromised, so it does not
share its channel with the transmitter and therefore only
minimal information about H2 is available to the latter.
2) The legitimate receiver, on the other hand, wishes to
maximize the rate so it shares its channel with the
transmitter. Its channel uncertainty is due to the limi-
tations of the feedback and estimation procedure, which
is normally much smaller than that of the eavesdropper
(and hence the known nominal part).
The secrecy capacity of this compound channel can be
characterized as follows. For this purpose we define
C(R,W1,W2) = ln
|I + W1R|
|I + W2R|
which depends on the transmit covariance matrix R and the
unknown channels W1 = H+1 H1 and W2 = H
+
2 H2 to the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper respectively.
Theorem 6. Consider the compound Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel in (35) when W1 and W2 are unknown and belong
to the uncertainty sets S1 and S2 in (75). Then, the compound
secrecy capacity Cc is
Cc = max
R
min
W1,W2
C(W1,W2,R)
= min
W1,W2
max
R
C(W1,W2,R) = Cw
= C(W1w,W2w,R
∗), (76)
i.e., the worst-case secrecy capacity Cw is also the (compound)
secrecy capacity Cc of the class of channels and Gaussian
signaling is optimal. The saddle-point property holds,
C(W1w,W2w,R) ≤ Cc = C(W1w,W2w,R∗)
≤ C(W1,W2,R∗), (77)
where (W1w,W2w,R∗) is the saddle-point. The worst-case
channel is
W1w = H
+
1wH1w, H1w = V0(Σ0 − 1I)+U+0 ,
W2w = I, (78)
where U0,V0 are unitary matrices of right and left singular
vectors of the nominal channel H0 and Σ0 is the diagonal
matrix of its singular values. The optimal covariance R∗ is
as in Theorem 4 with the substitution
gi → (σi(H0)− 1)2+, U1 → U0, (79)
i.e., the optimal signaling is on the eigenmodes of the degraded
nominal channel H1w and isotropic eavesdropper.
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix D.
Note that this theorem does not require the compound
channel to be degraded. Remarkably, the saddle-point property
still holds and the isotropic eavesdropper (of the maximum
gain) is still the worst-case one, even under the legitimate
channel uncertainty, and the optimal signaling is almost the
same as in Theorem 4 (Gaussian signaling is still optimal),
with the legitimate channel substituted by its degraded (due
to uncertainty) version. We observe that, as the uncertainty
(i.e. 1 and/or ) increases, fewer and fewer eigenmodes are
used until only the strongest one remains active, in which case
the beamforming is optimal (see (59)). From this perspective,
beamforming is the most robust strategy.
The game-theoretic interpretation of the inequalities in (77)
is the same as for the single-sided uncertainty: {W1w, I,R∗}
is a saddle-point in the matrix game between the transmitter on
one side and the eavesdropper and nature on the other; neither
can deviate from the optimal strategy without incurring penalty
provided that the other player follows the strategy.
A. Rank-Constrained Eavesdropper
Using similar arguments, Theorem 6 can be extended to the
rank-constrained eavesdropper channel,
S1 =
{
H1 : H1 = H0 + ∆H, |∆H|2 ≤ 1
}
(80a)
S2 =
{
H2 : |H2|2 ≤ , r(H2) ≤ r2
}
(80b)
where the eavesdropper rank is constrained by r2 (due to e.g.
limited number of antennas).
Theorem 7. Consider the compound Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel in (35) when H1 and H2 are unknown and belong to
the uncertainty sets S1 and S2 in (80). Assume that r(H0) =
r1 ≤ r2. Then, the compound secrecy capacity Cc is as in
(76); the saddle-point property in (77) holds and the worst-
case channel W1w is as in (78) while W2w is
W2w = 
2U0aU
+
0a, H2w = VΣ2wU
+
0 , (81)
where V is an arbitrary unitary matrix, semi-unitary matrix
U0a collects the columns of U0 corresponding to strictly
positive singular values, and
Σ2w = diag{, .., , 0, .., 0} (82)
is a diagonal matrix with the 1st r1 diagonal entries being
 and 0 otherwise. The optimal covariance R∗ is as in
Theorem 6, i.e. the optimal signalling is Gaussian and on the
eigenmodes of the worst-case legitimate channel H1w.
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix E.
VII. WEAK VS. STRONG SECRECY
The results above have been established under the strong
secrecy condition. It was demonstrated in [27, 28] that, for
regular (single-state or known) channels, strong and weak
secrecy capacities are the same. That result, however, does not
immediately apply to the compound setting here. Nevertheless,
it can be shown that the weak Cweakc and strong C
strong
c
compound secrecy capacities are the same,
Cweakc = C
strong
c (83)
if the saddle-point property holds under strong secrecy, i.e.
Cw = C
strong
c . Indeed, under the saddle point property,
Cw = C
strong
c ≤ Cweakc ≤ Cw (84)
from which (83) follows, where we have used the fact that the
worst-case capacity is the same under the strong and weak
secrecies, and that the strong compound secrecy capacity is
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not larger than the weak one. In particular, the results in
Theorems 4, 5 and Proposition 5 also hold under weak secrecy,
so that one can go from weak to strong secrecy for free in the
compound settings as well under the saddle-point property.
In fact, the chain argument in (84) has the following
implications:
• the saddle point under strong secrecy (Cw = Cstrongc ) im-
plies a saddle point under weak secrecy (Cw = Cweakc ),
• no saddle point under weak secrecy (Cw > Cweakc )
implies no saddle point under strong secrecy (Cw >
Cstrongc ).
VIII. CONCLUSION
The secrecy capacity of compound wiretap channels has
been studied. First, the achievable strong secrecy rate of
finite-state compound channels under finite alphabets in [18]
was extended to arbitrary uncertainty sets (not necessarily
countable or finite-state) and then to continuous input/output
alphabets and arbitrary compact uncertainty sets. Based on
this, the (strong) secrecy capacity of the compound Gaussian
MIMO wiretap channel has been established under the spectral
norm constraint on the eavesdropper channel. The channel is
not required to be degraded. The optimal signaling as well as
the secrecy capacity are given in a closed form. The saddle-
point property has been shown to hold, so that the compound
capacity equals to the worst-case one and signaling on the
worst-case channel achieves the compound capacity. Isotropic
eavesdropper is the worst-case one and signaling on the
eigenmodes of the legitimate channel is optimal. The results
are extended to non-isotropic uncertainty sets. It is shown that
the existence of a maximum element in the uncertainty set is
sufficient for a saddle-point to exist, so that compound capacity
equals to the worst-case one and signaling on the worst-case
channel achieves the capacity of the whole class of channels.
Finally, these results are extended to include the legitimate
channel uncertainty.
While the results above have been established under the
total power constraint trR ≤ PT , using similar reasoning
it can be shown that the same result holds under a general
power constraint of the form R ∈ SR, where SR is a unitary
invariant set of positive semi-definite matrices, i.e. R ∈ SR
implies URU+ ∈ SR for any unitary U. This constraint
limits possible eigenvalues of R but does not constrain in
any way its eigenvectors. Special cases include the total and
maximum per-eigenmode power constraints (either alone or in
combination with each other).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
It is known that the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel
depends only on its marginal channels and not on its joint
probability distribution5, cf. for instance from [3, Lemma 2.1].
Therefore, it suffices to find good approximations (W s, V s)
5In particular, two wiretap channels with different joint probability distri-
butions will have the same secrecy capacity if they share the same marginal
channel probabilities.
for the marginals (Ws, Vs) only, which simplifies the task
significantly. To this end, using [15, Lemma 4] for both
marginal channels, one obtains approximations that satisfy
|Ws(y|x)−W s(y|x)| ≤ |Y|/L ≤ |Y||Z|/L,
|Vs(z|x)− V s(z|x)| ≤ |Z|/L ≤ |Y||Z|/L,
Ws(y|x) ≤ 2
2|Y|2
L W s(y|x) ≤ 2
2|Y|2|Z|2
L W s(y|x),
Vs(z|x) ≤ 2
2|Z|2
L V s(z|x) ≤ 2
2|Y|2|Z|2
L V s(z|x)
for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , and z ∈ Z , and further for any input
distribution PX ∈ P(X )
|I(X;Ys)− I(X;Y s)| ≤ 2|Y|3/2/L1/2 ≤ 2(|Y||Z|)3/2/L1/2,
|I(X;Zs)− I(X;Zs)| ≤ 2|Z|3/2/L1/2 ≤ 2(|Y||Z|)3/2/L1/2.
Note that in the first step, the application of [15, Lemma 4]
yields bounds, where the constants are different and depend on
their own alphabet size, i.e., either on |Y| or on |Z|, which is
difficult to use in the following analysis. The 2nd step results
in the bounds with the same constant, which facilitates the
further analysis.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The first property (13) follows by observing that for all
xn ∈ Xn and yn ∈ Yn we have
Wns (y
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
Ws(yi|xi)
≤ 2n |Y|
2|Z|2
L
n∏
i=1
W s(yi|xi)
= 2n
|Y|2|Z|2
L W
n
s (y
n|xn)
which naturally extends to decoding sets as Wns (Dcm|xn) ≤
2n
|Y|2|Z|2
L W
n
s (Dcm|xn) and likewise for the error probability.
The more interesting part is the robustness of the secrecy
constraint. Following the classical approach in [15, Lemma 4]
would lead to a bound which is too loose to prove what we
aim for, cf. also Remark 4. Therefore, we make use of a recent
result in [29, Lemma 2].
Lemma 5. Let X and Y be finite alphabets and W,W : X →
P(Y) be arbitrary channels with
max
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
|W (y|x)−W (y|x)| ≤  (85)
for some  > 0. For arbitrary n ∈ N, let U be an arbitrary
finite set, PU ∈ P(U) the uniform distribution on U , and
E(xn|u), xn ∈ Xn an arbitrary stochastic encoder, cf. (1).
We consider the probability distributions
PUY n(u, y
n) =
∑
xn∈Xn
Wn(yn|xn)E(xn|u)PU (u)
PUY n(u, y
n) =
∑
xn∈Xn
W
n
(yn|xn)E(xn|u)PU (u).
Then it holds that∣∣I(U ;Y n‖P )− I(U ;Y n‖P )∣∣ ≤ 4n( log |Y|+H2()) (86)
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where I(U ;Y n‖P ) means that the mutual information is
evaluated under the joint probability distribution P .
Proof: The proof is based on the technique developed for
quantum channels in [30] and can be found in Appendix B of
[29].
Note that this lemma must be applied carefully: In the
problem at hand, the channels Vs and V s satisfy |Vs(z|x) −
V s(z|x)| ≤ |Y||Z|/L for all x ∈ X and z ∈ Z , cf. (11a)-
(11b). Thus, (85) is satisfied with  = |Y||Z|2/L which then
yields the desired result, i.e.,
|I(M ;Zns )−I(M ;Z
n
s )| ≤ 4n
(|Y||Z|2 log |Z|/L+H2(|Y||Z|2/L)).
(87)
This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Proposition 7
The following lemma is instrumental.
Lemma 6. Let W1,W2, ... be a bounded and increasing
sequence of positive semi-definite matrices, i.e.
0 ≤W1 ≤W2 ≤ .. ≤Wi ≤ ... ≤ aI (88)
where 0 < a < ∞ is a positive constant. This sequence
converges.
Proof: Consider the following sequence of (non-negative)
scalars αi = x+Wix, where x is a vector of appropriate size;
for convenience, we take |x| = 1. Since {Wi} is an increasing
and bounded sequence, so is {αi},
0 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 ≤ .. ≤ αi ≤ ... ≤ a (89)
and therefore it converges to some non-negative number
b(x) = limi→∞ αi ≤ a. Hence, for any  > 0, there is
such n(,x) that b(x) − αi <  ∀i > n(,x),x. Since this
is true for any x, take n() = maxx n(,x) and observe that
|b(x) − αi| <  ∀i > n() and all x. It follows that {αi} is
a Cauchy sequence, i.e. |αj − αi| <  ∀i, j > n() and all x,
i.e.
x+(Wj −Wi)x <  ∀x
from which it follows that λ1(Wj−Wi) <  and thus ‖Wj−
Wi‖ → 0 in any norm (since all norms are equivalent [39]),
i.e. {Wi} is a Cauchy sequence and thus converges [45, 46],
Wi →W ≤ aI. Taking Frobenius norm, one obtains element-
wise convergence of this matrix sequence.
Note that this result generalizes to matrices the well-
known fact that any scalar increasing and bounded sequence
converges.
To proceed further, observe from the definition of S2m that
min
W2∈S2
C(R,W2) ≤ min
W2∈S2m
C(R,W2). (90)
We prove the equality by contradiction. Assume that
min
W2∈S2
C(R,W2) < min
W2∈S2m
C(R,W2) (91)
and let W∗2 = arg minW2∈S2 C(R,W2) be a minimizer over
S2. Then, W∗2 /∈ S2m (due to the strict inequality) so that
there exists W21 ∈ S2 such that W21 ≥W∗2 (otherwise W∗2
were in S2m), W21 6= W∗2 , and C(R,W21) ≤ C(R,W∗2).
If W21 ∈ S2m, we have a contradiction:
C(R,W21) ≤ C(R,W∗2)
< min
W2∈S2m
C(R,W2)
≤ C(R,W21). (92)
Assume further that W21 /∈ S2m so that there exists such
W22 ∈ S2 that W22 ≥ W21, W22 6= W21, and the
process is repeated. In this way, we construct a non-decreasing,
bounded sequence {W∗2,W21, ...,W2i, ...}, which either ter-
minates in a finite number of steps (when some W2k ∈ S2m
so we cannot find a greater one) or it continues indefinitely. In
the first case, we have a contradiction and thus the assertion
is proved.
In the second case, we claim that the sequence will converge
to some W ∈ S2m. To see this, first observe that this sequence
will converge to some W ∈ S2 (due to Lemma 6, since S2
is bounded and closed and thus compact and the sequence is
increasing and bounded; the boundedness can be understood
in any norm, since all matrix norms are equivalent). Thus, we
have to prove that W ∈ S2m. To see this, first observe that
W ≥W2i ∀i (since the sequence is increasing). If W /∈ S2m,
then there exists W∗ ∈ S2 such that W∗ ≥ W ≥ W21 so
it can be taken as a part of the constructed sequence and thus
W cannot be its limit - a contradiction. Therefore, W ∈ S2m,
as claimed. This, however, results in a contradiction to (91)
so that (64) holds. To see (65), take maxR in (90)-(92) and
apply the same argument.
D. Proof of Theorem 6
First, we observe that
C(W1,W2,R) ≥ C(W1, I,R) ∀R,W1, (93)
since W2 ≤ I (which follows from |W2|2 ≤ ) and |I+WR|
is monotonically increasing in W for any (positive semi-
definite) R. The lower bound is achieved by W2 = I.
Therefore,
min
W2
C(W1,W2,R) = C(W1, I,R) ∀R,W1, (94)
and also
Cw = min
W1
max
R
C(W1, I,R)
= min
W1
max
R
ln
|I + W1R|
|I + Λ|
(a)
= min
W1
max
R
∑
i
ln
1 + λi(W1)λi(R)
1 + λi(R)
(b)
= max
{λi}
∑
i
ln
1 + (σi(H0)− 1)2+λi
1 + λi
= C(W1w, I,R
∗) (95)
where (a) follows from the inequality
|I + W1R| ≤
∏
i
(1 + λi(W1)λi(R)) (96)
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which follows from [42, Theorem 3.3.14(c)] with f(x) =
ln(1 + x), where λi(W1), λi(R) are ordered likewise and
the equality is achieved when W1,R have the same eigen-
vectors; (b) follows from the inequality σi(H1) ≥ (σi(H0)−
σ1(∆H))+ (see e.g. [39, 42]) and λi(W1) = σ2i (H1) where
the equality is achieved by H1w.
We further observe that the saddle-point property in (76) is
equivalent to (see e.g. [33])
C(W1w, I,R)
(a)
≤C(W1w, I,R∗)
(b)
≤C(W1,W2,R∗) (97)
and we prove these inequalities below thus establishing (76).
Note that (a) follows from (95) (since R∗ is the optimal
covariance for W1 = W1w,W2 = I). To prove (b), we
need the following technical lemma, which is an extension of
well-known singular value inequalities for a sum and a product
of two matrices (see e.g. [39, 42]):
Lemma 7. Let A, B and C be n×m and m×m matrices,
and let the right singular vectors of A be the same as the left
singular vectors of C so that their singular value decompo-
sitions (SVD) are A = UΣaV+ and C = VΣcW+, where
U,V,W are unitary and Σa = diag{σai},Σc = diag{σci}
are “diagonal” matrices of singular values of A and C.
Assume that {σai} and {σci} are in decreasing order. Then,
σi((A + B)C) ≥ (σi(A)− σ1(B))+σi(C) (98)
where σi((A + B)C) are also in decreasing order. The
equality is achieved by B = −UΣbV+, where Σb =
diag{min(σi(A), )}.
Proof: The proof is based on the variational characteri-
zation of singular values, see [47] for details.
Using this lemma, one obtains:
Cw = C(W1w, I,R
∗)
(a)
=
∑
i
ln
1 + (σi(H0)− 1)2+λ∗i
1 + λ∗i
(b)
≤
∑
i
ln
1 + σ2i (H1R
∗1/2)
1 + λ∗i
= C(W1, I,R
∗)
(c)
≤C(W1,W2,R∗) (99)
where (a) follows from (95), (b) follows from Lemma 7
applied to A = H0,B = ∆H,C = R∗1/2 (and observing,
from (47), that the singular values of H0 and R∗1/2 are
ordered likewise), where we have used λi(R) = σ2i (R
1/2),
and (c) follows from (93). This establishes (97) and thus (76).
E. Proof of Theorem 7
Using the argument similar to that in (70), it follows that
ln |I + W2R∗| =
r2∑
i=1
ln(1 + λi(W2R
∗))
≤
r1∑
i=1
ln(1 + λi(W2)λi(R
∗))
≤
r1∑
i=1
ln(1 + 2λi(R
∗))
= ln |I + W2wR∗| (100)
and
ln |I + W1R∗| =
r1∑
i=1
ln(1 + λi(W1R
∗))
(a)
=
r1∑
i=1
ln(1 + σ2i ((H0 + ∆H)R
∗ 12 ))
(b)
≥
r1∑
i=1
ln(1 + (σi(H0)− 1)2+λi(R∗))
= ln |I + W1wR∗| (101)
for any W1 ∈ S1 and W2 ∈ S2, where (a) follows
from λi(R) = σ2i (R) and (b) follows from the singular
value inequalities in Lemma 7. Combining these two chain
inequalities, one obtains
C(W1w,W2w,R
∗) ≤ C(W1,W2,R∗) (102)
which establishes the 2nd inequality in (77). The 1st inequality
follows from the fact that R∗ is the optimal covariance under
W1 = W1w and W2 = W2w. Since the saddle-point
inequalities in (77) are equivalent to max min = min max
in (76) (see e.g. [33]), this also establishes the latter claim.
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